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Abstract
We consider a two-stage model of locational choice. Firms decide in which of three locations (or
countries) to build plants; they then compete in all three markets. Knowledge spillovers reduce marginal
costs in agglomerations; through intra-firm spillovers these cost reductions can be exported to other
locations. We show that improvements in the exchange of information within firms make agglomeration
more likely, because knowledge obtained in the center can be transmitted to other locations more easily.
Decreases in transportation costs tend to destabilize agglomerations, since competition for peripheral
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1 Introduction 
Recently, economists have been trying to understand how integration in the sense of 
reduced trade and transportation costs affects the geographical distribution of production 
(see e.g. Krugman 1991; Krugman and Venables 1995, 1996; Livas-Elizondo and Krugman 
1996; Venables 1996). Another aspect of integration, the rapid decrease in long distance 
communication costs, has received comparatively little attention. This may be due to the 
fact that the effect of this development on geographical production patterns seems obvious. 
With decreasing communication costs, it would appear that peripheral regions become 
more attractive locations of production.  
In this paper, we argue that decreasing communication costs can nevertheless favor the 
emergence of geographical concentration within industries. The reasoning is as follows. 
Consider several oligopolists that have to choose where to locate. Suppose these firms have 
the option to produce in more than one location, e.g., to become multinational. Further, 
suppose competition in each location is so sharp that oligopolists producing homogeneous 
goods earn low, possibly even zero profits. Then, if transportation costs are positive, firms 
can alleviate this problem by spatial differentiation. Suppose, however, that geographical 
proximity of production facilities leads to technological spillovers between different firms 
(external spillovers), which reduce production costs. In addition, suppose a firm can 
transmit some of the knowledge it obtains in one plant to its other plants through intra-firm 
communication channels (internal spillovers). Then agglomerations, that is, locations 
where several firms produce, may emerge even though geographical proximity implies 
intensive competition between firms: the presence in the agglomeration helps firms to 
obtain technological knowledge that they can use to increase their profits in locations 
where they have greater market power. 
In this argument, positive transportation costs and sufficiently low communication costs are 
required. A firm will only be able to enjoy high profits in a location where it is the only 
producer if transportation costs are non-zero. The transfer of knowledge gained in 
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agglomerations to such a ”peripheral location” will only be possible if intra-firm 
communication is sufficiently cheap. Therefore, agglomerations are easier to support with 
low communication costs: a greater part of the knowledge gained in these locations will be 
transferred to the periphery, where it serves to increase profits.  
In addition, our analysis sheds light on the effects of transportation costs on locational 
patterns: decreasing transportation costs may weaken agglomerations. Essentially, if 
transportation costs are low, the profits a firm earns in the periphery are low: despite the 
fact that the firm is the only local producer, competition from the center is intensive. 
Hence, the gains from building a plant in an agglomeration are small: these gains arise 
mainly because the knowledge obtained in the agglomeration serves to increase monopoly 
profits in other locations. With sufficiently low transportation costs, these monopoly profits 
may become too small to justify a plant in an agglomeration. 
This paper makes the above arguments more precise. We specify under which conditions 
the combination of locational and intra-firm spillovers leads to agglomerations. We then 
use our results to show that lower communication costs and higher transportation costs may 
strengthen agglomerations. 
Several empirical examples show that locational decisions of multi-plant firms are 
influenced by the desire to obtain knowledge in agglomerations with the goal of reducing 
costs elsewhere. In the nineteen-sixties and seventies, Japanese firms practiced 
”technological sourcing” (Neven and Siotis, 1995). They entered markets in Europe and the 
United States in order to gain access to the know-how of competitors. This knowledge was 
then transmitted to their plants in Japan, where it was used to design their own products 
and productive processes. In turn, the flow of knowledge from Japanese plants to their U.S. 
transplants has been important recently: intra-firm channels enabled Japanese companies to 
reach a productivity in the United States close to the level in the Japanese plants.1 Also, the 
                                                 
1In this process, the rotation of managers and engineers played an important role (see e.g. Baily and 
Gersbach, 1995).   
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presence of intra-firm channels has been important in the location decisions of Japanese 
and US firms within the United States. As argued by Head et al. (1995), initial investments 
by Japanese firms attracted subsequent investors in the same industry or industry group 
who wanted to gain access to the knowledge present in these states. Another example for 
the importance of intra-firm communication channels comes from the banking sector: 
German banks recently moved some of their activities to London. For this move, learning 
from the London banking scene was an important motivation (Economist, 1995). 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we formulate a two-stage game of 
locational choice by duopolists. In section 3, we characterize the subgame-perfect 
equilibria of this game. In section 4, we apply the results to analyze the effects of 
informational integration (decreasing communication costs). Section 5 deals with the 
effects of transportation costs. Section 6 shows how our results can be extended from price 
competition to more general forms of oligopolistic interaction. Section 7 concludes. 
2 A Two-Stage Model of Locational Choice 
Consider the following two-stage game with two firms, A and B, and three locations, 1, 2, 
and 3.  
The first stage 
In the first period, both firms decide in which of the three locations, if any, to acquire 
production capacities. If a firm acquires capacities, it has the option to produce in that 
location in period 2. The first-period choices of the two firms are summarized by vectors 
sA  andsB ∈ 0,1{ }× 0,1{ }× 0,1{ }, where the i-th component is 1 if the firm acquires 
capacities at the corresponding location. The fixed costs of acquiring capacities are given 
as F, irrespective of the location. 
First-period location decisions affect marginal production costs δ   as follows.  
1. At a location where only one firm has a plant, marginal production costs are given 
as  δ =H if there is no other location where both firms have a plant (a joint location).  
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2. At a joint location, δ =L=0. 
3. If a joint location exists, marginal production costs at a location where only one 
firm  has a plant, are given as δ =M= (1 −γ )H , where γ ∈ 0,1[ ], so that H ≥ M .  
The rationale for this distinction is as follows. 
First, the assumption that production costs are low (L=0)2 when both firms are at the same 
location captures the notion of technological spillovers, as discussed by Marshall (1920).3 
For instance, suppose that through learning by doing an increase of productive efficiency 
arises as a joint product with output in each firm. Even if the decision makers in two firms 
start with the same level of experience in their activities, the trial and error process of 
learning may lead to different outcomes and therefore to different productivities (see 
Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1995). Hence, a firm might enjoy a greater productivity increase if 
it has easy access to knowledge of competitors. Access may be facilitated by geographical 
proximity, because it simplifies labor rotation between firms and communication between 
employees (see Jaffe et al. 1993, Head et al. 1995, Audretsch and Feldman 1996). Thus, 
proximity may foster the exchange of different learning experiences, and firms that are 
close to others may achieve greater cost reductions than firms in isolated locations.4 
Second, we assume that at least some of the knowledge generated at one location can be 
transferred to other plants within the same firm. In other words, a firm that benefits from 
locational spillovers in one location also has lower production costs elsewhere; this is 
reflected in the inequality H≥ M. Empirical studies suggest that intra-firm channels are 
used extensively in multi-plant firms. For instance, Baily and Gersbach (1995) show that 
companies that have achieved high productivity in one location have been able to replicate 
almost the same productivity advantage in their other plants in industrialized countries.5 
                                                 
2The assumption that L=0 is made for simplicity; our analysis still holds as long L ≤ M ≤ H . 
3Low production costs could also result from other types of Marshallian externalities, such as shared 
infrastructure or labor pooling. 
4Strictly speaking, to justify the argument that costs are lower where firms are concentrated we need the 
additional assumption that general equilibrium effects through higher wages are too low to offset the cost 
advantage. 
5Note that we have excluded intrafirm learning for firms that never benefits from external spillovers; we 
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We include the possibility that intra-firm communication is only an imperfect substitute for 
geographical proximity; that is, we allow for the case that M>L=0, i.e. γ <1 . For instance, 
the transmission of knowledge depends on intra-firm mobility of labor across plants, on 
communication costs, and on incentives to share experiences. In particular, the exchange of 
information between plants may be limited if plant managers’ remuneration schemes are 
determined by relative performance schemes.6 In the following, we shall interpret γ  as a 
measure of the quality of intra-firm communication, or, somewhat loosely, as an inverse 
measure of communication cost. Similarly, other things being equal, a lower value of M 
stands for lower (intra-firm) communication costs. 
The second stage 
In period 2, firms compete in all three markets. The local demand in each location is given 
as a monotone decreasing function D(p), where p is the product price; in particular, 
locations are identical in terms of demand. We assume that firms will attempt to maximize 
the sum of profits in all three locations. Therefore, firms will choose to serve each location 
in the cheapest possible way. To sell goods at a location where production does not take 
place, a firm must incur transportation costs of T for each unit of the good. Joint locations 
will therefore always be served locally, because this involves the smallest possible 
marginal costs of L=0. Similarly, locations where the firm does not produce will be served 
from joint locations whenever joint locations exist, because this involves the smallest 
possible total marginal costs of T. Periphery locations where the firm has a plant will be 
served locally if no joint location exists or if M<T. 
Given the production capacities and the resulting costs in each location, both firms compete 
simultaneously on all three markets. In order to simplify the exposition, we first assume 
                                                                                                                                                    
assume that the firm’s marginal costs are independent of its own number of plants. This can be justified if the 
correlation between the learning experiences in different plants of the same firm is high relative to the 
correlation between learning experiences of different firms. 
6If localization advantages arise from labor pooling and common suppliers (see footnote 3) and not only from 
spillovers, γ < 1 is even more natural: only those cost reductions that are the result of knowledge spillovers 
can be transferred easily to other locations.  
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Bertrand competition, i.e., firms produce homogeneous goods and compete in prices in 
each location, so that, for each firm, a second-period strategy consists of a price for each 
combination of locations and first-period strategies sA, sB( ). This assumption highlights 
sharp competition; we shall show in section 6 how our ideas generalize to other forms of 
competition.  
We shall assume that profits obtained in one location are independent of actions taken in 
other locations. Hence, we can think of a Nash equilibrium in the second period as a 
combination of three Nash equilibria, one in each location. Because of Bertrand 
competition, for each location l there exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the production 
game corresponding to marginal costs δAl  and δBl  of serving this location. The resulting 
gross duopoly profits for firms A and B in location i are written as ΠAl (δ Al ,δ Bl )   and 
ΠBl (δBl ,δAl ) , respectively. Note that the first expression in brackets denotes marginal 
production costs of the firm whose profit is being considered, while the second expression 
stands for the competitor’s marginal costs. For Bertrand competition, a firm’s profit is only 
positive if its marginal costs are lower than the competitor’s, that is ΠAl (δ Al ,δ Bl ) >0 only if 
δAl < δBl  and similarly for firm B. If δAl  is only slightly lower than δBl , firm A sets it price 
just below δBl . If δAl  is much lower than δBl , firm A sets the monopoly price and obtains 
the monopoly profit that we denote as ΠA (δ Al ) = ΠA (δ Al ,∞) . We can write the total second-
period payoff of firm A as  
ΠA = Π A1 δA1 ,δ B1( )+ ΠA2 δA2 ,δB2( )+ ΠA3 δA3 ,δB3( ), 
and similarly for B. Indices will be dropped whenever convenient. For example, if 
locational choices are sA = 1,1,0( )  and sB = 0,1,1( )  and M<T, we obtain  
ΠA = Π A1 M,T( )+ Π A2 0,0( ) + ΠA3 T , M( ) = Π M,T( )+ Π 0,0( )+ Π T, M( ) = Π M, T( ) , 
since Π(0,0) = Π(T, M) =0. Similarly, ΠB = Π M ,T( ). To obtain net profits, fixed costs 
have to be subtracted. Thus, net profits in the example are Π M ,T( )− 2F  for both firms. 
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3 Equilibria 
In the following, we describe which first-period choices (sA, sB)  can arise as parts of 
subgame perfect equilibria for parameter constellations satisfying our general assumptions. 
We limit our discussion to equilibria in which both firms are active.7  
Definition 1.We speak of a differentiation equilibrium if the first-period choices in a 
subgame-perfect equilibrium are sA = (0,0,1); sB = (1,1, 0)[ ]. We speak of an agglomeration 
equilibrium if the first-period choices are sA = (0,1,1); sB = (1, 0,1)[ ]. 
The following proposition gives conditions under which the two equilibria will arise. 
Proposition 1. With Bertrand competition,  
(i) sA = (0,0,1); sB = (1,1, 0)[ ] (DIFFERENTIATION) is an equilibrium8 if and only if one of 
the following two sets of conditions hold: 
Π(H, H + T ) ≥ F  (1) 
M ≥ T (2) 
or  
Π(H, H + T ) ≥ F  (1) 
2Π(H,H + T ) − 2F ≥ 2Π(M,T ) − 3F  (3) 
(ii) sA = (1,1,0); sB = (0,1,1)[ ] (AGGLOMERATION) is an equilibrium if and only if 
conditions (4) and (5) hold simultaneously. 
                                                 
7It can be shown that for appropriate parameter constellations, the following three equilibria can arise: an 
equilibrium where no firm produces, an equilibrium where one firm serves the entire world from one 
location, and an equilibrium where one of the two firms is a monopolist, but has a plant in each location. 
However, in all of these equilibria at most one firm produces. As discussed in Gersbach and Schmutzler 
(1996), the existence of these additional equilibria does not affect the qualitative insights. 
8Here and in the following, we use the shorthand ” (sA , sB )  is an equilibrium” if (possibly after relabelling of 
firms and/or locations) there exist second period strategies for both players that, together with (sA , sB ) , are a 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. 
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Π(M ,T ) ≥ 2F   (4) 
Π(M ,T ) − Π(H, H + T ) ≥ F . (5) 
The proof involves a simple check of best-response conditions (see appendix). To 
understand the conditions for the differentiation equilibrium, suppose first that firm B, 
which has two plants in equilibrium, deviates by building an additional plant in a joint 
location. First of all, such deviations cannot be profitable if M ≥ T; in this case, the firm 
would never use the plants outside the joint location, and it would earn zero gross profits. 
Now suppose M<T. Then, because of Bertrand competition, firm B still earns zero profits 
in the joint location. However, the additional plant has an ambiguous effect on profits in 
locations where firm B produces on its own: on the one hand, the cost reduction in the 
center helps to reduce costs in the periphery through intra-firm spillovers. On the other 
hand, the competitor benefits from the joint location because he can serve the periphery at 
costs T rather than H+T. In each of the two locations where the deviating firm B produces 
on its own, it therefore obtains profits Π(M ,T )  rather than Π(H, H + T )  before the 
deviation. If Π(M ,T ) > Π(H, H + T ) , which is always the case if transportation costs are 
sufficiently high, the deviating firm will obtain higher profits than before in the locations 
where it produces on its own. Total deviation profit is 2Π(M ,T ) -3F. Comparing this with 
the profit firm B obtains in the differentiation equilibrium (2 Π(H, H + T ) -2F), we see that, 
for M<T, the deviation will be unprofitable if and only if condition (3) holds. 
Similar considerations show that firm A does not deviate by building a plant in a joint 
location if Π(H, H + T ) ≥ Π(M,T ) − F . It is simple to show that this condition is implied 
by (3).  
As to the agglomeration equilibrium, note that this can only occur if M<T: otherwise, firms 
would not use their plants in the periphery; it would be cheaper to serve the periphery from 
the center. In particular, firms would make zero gross profits, because there is no location 
that they can serve cheaper than the competitor. Even if M<T, lower costs in the periphery 
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resulting from the joint location must outweigh the greater intensity of competition and the 
fixed costs (condition (5)). 
To sum up, despite tough competition (as captured by the Bertrand assumption), an 
agglomeration equilibrium rather than a differentiation equilibrium may result if intra-firm 
spillovers are sufficiently strong: because of these spillovers, firms are willing to incur 
losses in the agglomeration if this leads to sufficiently strong profit increases in periphery 
locations.9 
Finally, note that the two equilibria are mutually exclusive. 
Corollary. There is no combination of parameters for which a differentiation equilibrium 
and an agglomeration equilibrium exist at the same time. 
The corollary follows immediately from proposition 1. Intuitively, for an agglomeration 
equilibrium, the best response to sB = (1,1,0)  is sA = (0,1,1) , while for a differentiation 
equilibrium the best response to sB = (1,1,0)  is sA = (0,0,1) . These two requirements are 
incompatible, since the strategy of firm B is the same in both cases. 
4 The Effects of Informational Integration 
In this section, we examine the effects of informational integration on locational patterns. 
Informational integration corresponds to an increase of γ , for instance, as a result of better 
intra-firm communication. As a benchmark, we first consider the case without intra-firm 
spillovers ( γ = 0 ). 
Proposition 2.(i) Without intra-firm spillovers (γ =0), there will never be an 
agglomeration equilibrium under Bertrand competition. 
(ii) Under Bertrand competition, an increase in informational integration (γ ) makes 
agglomeration equilibria more likely and differentiation equilibria less likely.  
                                                 
9 It is clear why at least three locations are necessary to develop our argument. With two locations, if duopoly 
profits are lower than fixed costs, at least one of the two firms could benefit from moving out of the 
agglomeration. With only one remaining location, at most one of the firms can be the only local producer in 
some other location. 
 11
Proof. (i) For γ =0, (5) never holds, because Π(M ,T ) − Π(H, H + T ) =  
Π(H,T ) − Π(H, H + T ) ≤ 0 . 
(ii) An increase in γ  increases Π(M ,T ) = Π((1− γ )H,T )  and leaves all other terms in 
proposition 1 unaffected. The result therefore follows immediately from proposition 1. 
Proposition 2 indicates that informational integration tends to work in favor of 
agglomerations. With Bertrand competition, production in agglomerations is never 
worthwhile when there are no internal spillovers. Even though external technological 
spillovers reduce costs in the agglomeration, competition is so sharp that producing in the 
agglomeration will not be worthwhile: net profits are negative. With internal 
communication, however, a part of the cost reduction in the center can be exported to the 
periphery. This cost reduction in the periphery increases monopoly profits. The better the 
internal communication, the greater this positive effect of entering agglomerations. 10 
A numerical example 
As an example of the effects of numerical integration, we consider the following 
specification of our model. The demand in each location is given by 
D(p)=a-p. 
Transportation costs are assumed to be sufficiently high, so that a firm that is the only local 
producer can set monopoly prices. In a location where both firms are present, firms 
compete à la Bertrand and make zero profits. Applying standard formulae for monopoly 
choices of prices and quantities with linear demand, we obtain: 
Π (1− γ )H, T( )= Π (1 − γ )H( ) = a − (1 −γ )H( )2 4 ; 
Π H, H + T( ) = Π H( ) = a − H( )2 4 . 
Hence, 
                                                 
10Note the emphasis on internal communication here. Improvements in long-distance informational 
integration between different firms may make agglomerations less likely, as locational spillovers become less 
important. 
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Π (1− γ )H, T( )− Π H, H + T( ) = γH(2a + H(γ − 2)( ) 4 . 
Using proposition 1, an agglomeration equilibrium therefore exists if and only if  
a − (1 −γ )H( )2 / 4 ≥ 2F    and  γH(2a + H(γ − 2)) / 4 ≥ F . 
To see how increasing informational integration affects the likelihood of agglomeration, we 
specify parameters as follows. Suppose a=10, H=3, F=7.5. Suppose further that everything 
that is known in the center can be transferred to the periphery in principle, however, at 
communication costs of 2 units per unit output. Then, marginal costs in the periphery, 
including communication costs, amount to (1 −γ )H =2, so that γ = 1/ 3 . For these 
parameter values, the second condition for an agglomeration equilibrium is violated 
because γH(2a + H(γ − 2)) / 4 =15/4<7.5=F. Hence, agglomeration does not occur. The 
differentiation equilibrium exists since Π(H, H + T ) =12.25 > 7.5 = F  and 
2Π(H,H + T ) − 2Π((1 −γ )H,T ) + F = 0 . Suppose now that the level of informational 
integration increases to γ = 2 / 3 , that is, the cost of transferring knowledge falls by a factor 
of 2. The conditions for agglomeration are now both fulfilled, while the differentiation 
equilibrium no longer exists. Thus, the increase in informational integration produces 
agglomeration. 
5 The Effects of Trade Integration 
Reductions in trade costs are often seen as favorable to the emergence of agglomerations, 
because they make it more attractive to serve large areas from central locations. In the 
following, we shall give a reason why reductions in trade costs might lead to the 
dissolution of agglomerations. 
First, note that decreasing transportation costs increase the competition in the periphery, 
and thus also decrease the value of knowledge obtained in a joint location, and hence the 
profit obtained in periphery locations in an agglomeration equilibrium ( Π(M ,T ) ). 
However, decreasing transportation costs also lower profits in monopoly locations in the 
differentiated equilibrium ( Π(H, H + T ) ). Thus, it is not evident whether decreasing 
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transportation costs favor agglomeration; a clear-cut result requires a monotonicity 
assumption about Π(M ,T ) − Π(H, H + T ) . Clearly, this expression is decreasing in T for 
T<M. For T>M, however, we make the following assumption. 
Assumption 1. Π(M ,T ) − Π(H, H + T )  is non-decreasing in T for T>M. 
At the end of this section, we shall show that this assumption holds under fairly general 
conditions on demand functions. 
Proposition 3. Suppose assumption 1 holds. 
(i) Reductions in trade costs make joint location equilibria less likely. 
(ii) For suitable parameter values, a reduction of transportation costs can lead to the 
replacement of agglomeration equilibria by differentiation equilibria. 
Proof. See appendix. 
The proposition suggests that a reduction in transportation costs may favor deglomeration. 
This is precisely opposite to the case of informational integration, which favored 
agglomeration. The intuition for this result is as follows. In our setting, the only reason to 
produce in an agglomeration is to obtain spillovers that, through intra-firm communication 
increase profits in peripheral locations. These profits are only significant when 
transportation costs are high. Reducing transportation costs therefore decreases the profits 
Π(M ,T )  of a firm in a periphery location that also has a plant in a joint location. This 
tends to favor deglomeration. On the other hand, of course, higher transportation costs also 
increase the profits of a firm producing in an isolated location when there is no joint 
location ( Π(H, H + T ) ), which favors agglomeration. Assumption 1 makes sure that the 
former effect dominates over the latter.   
Figure 1 illustrates the proposition; note that the relevant parameter area for part (ii) is the 
interval between ˜ γ  and γ * .  
Fig. 1. The effects of integration 
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We are left with a justification of the assumption that the expression 
Π(M ,T ) − Π(H, H + T )  is non-decreasing in T for T>M. It is for instance satisfied if the 
following two conditions hold simultaneously: 
a) pH − H < pM ; where pδ  is the monopoly price for marginal costs δ . 
b) D(T)(T-M)-D(H)T is increasing in T. 
The first condition is interpreted as follows. As soon as the transportation costs are high 
enough to guarantee that the competitor’s marginal costs (including transportation) are 
higher than the monopoly price, a firm will set the monopoly price. A further increase in T 
will have no effect on profits. A firm that produces with marginal costs H, while the 
competitor produces with H+T, charges the monopoly price as soon as H + T > pH , or 
equivalently, T > pH − H ; a firm that produces with marginal costs M while the competitor 
produces with T charges the monopoly price as soon as T > pM . Hence, for 
T > max pM , pH − H{ }, Π(M ,T ) − Π(H, H + T )  is constant as a function of T. By condition 
a), max pM , pH − H{ }= pM . In the interval, pH − H, pM[ ], the expression 
Π(M ,T ) − Π(H, H + T )  is strictly increasing.11 Condition a) is relatively easy to fulfill. It 
holds if there is no overshifting of the original increase in marginal costs on monopoly 
prices.12  
The expression in b) gives Π(M ,T ) − Π(H, H + T )  in the case that transportation costs are 
so low that neither firm chooses the monopoly price. Condition b) amounts to 
D(T ) − D(H + T ) ′ D (T )M[ ]+ T ′ D (T ) − ′ D (H + T)( )[ ]>0. The term in the first square 
bracket is always positive. The last term is positive if and only if ′ D (T ) < ′ D (H + T ) . 
                                                 
11If instead we had max pM , pH − H{ } = pH − H , the expression Π(M, T ) − Π(H , H + T)  would be 
decreasing in T in the interval pM , pH − H[ ]. 
12Using the standard monopoly pricing formula, a) can be rewritten as pH / εp H < p M / εpM + (1 − γ ) H ,where 
ε
p
= − p ⋅ ′ D ( p) D( p)  denotes the demand elasticity at price p.  This elasticity condition is fulfilled as long as 
− ′ D ( p) D( p)  does not decrease with higher prices. 
 
 15
Hence, as long as ′ D  does not decrease substantially with higher prices, condition b) is 
always fulfilled. Summing up, assumption 1 will hold whenever demand functions are not 
very convex. 
6 Beyond Bertrand Competition 
So far, we have restricted our attention to price competition with homogeneous goods. In 
the following, we shall briefly demonstrate that this assumption is not crucial to our results. 
We can extend the analysis to price competition with differentiated goods, quantity 
competition, etc., as long as the following requirement is satisfied. 
Assumption 2.  Π(0,0) + 2max Π(T,T ),Π(H, H){ }< F   
The left-hand side of this inequality is an upper bound on the profits a firm can make using 
one plant if there is no location where it produces on its own. It captures the notion of 
sufficiently intense price competition: without any spatial differentiation, firms will not 
find production worthwhile. The assumption is trivially fulfilled for Bertrand competition 
with homogeneous goods because the left-hand side is zero, but it clearly holds for more 
general situations. 
The following proposition gives conditions under which the two equilibria will arise.13 
Proposition 4. Suppose assumption 2 holds. The following equivalences hold. 
(i) sA = (0,0,1); sB = (1,1, 0)[ ] (DIFFERENTIATION) is an equilibrium if and only if 
conditions 6 and 7 or conditions 6, 8a, 8b hold: 
2Π(H,H + T ) + Π(H + T, H) ≥ F  (6) 
M>T (7) 
2Π(H,H + T ) + Π(H + T, H) + F ≥ 2Π(M ,T ) + Π(0,0)  (8a) 
Π(H, H + T ) + 2Π(H + T, H) + F ≥ Π(M ,T) + Π(T ,M) + Π(0,0)  (8b) 
                                                 
13Again, it can be shown that for appropriate parameter constellations, the following three equilibria can 
arise: an equilibrium where no firm produces, an equilibrium where one firm serves the entire world from one 
location, and an equilibrium where one of the two firms is a monopolist, but has a plant in each location (see 
Gersbach and Schmutzler 1996). 
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(ii) sA = (0,1,1); sB = (1, 0,1)[ ] (AGGLOMERATION) is an equilibrium if and only if the 
following conditions hold: 
Π(M ,T ) + Π(T, M) + Π(0, 0) ≥ 2F  (9) 
Π(M ,T ) + Π(T, M) + Π(0, 0) ≥ Π(H, H + T) + 2Π(H + T ,H ) + F  (10) 
The proof is a straightforward generalization of proposition 1. Assumption 2 suffices to 
guarantee that production in more than one joint location is never worthwhile, and it also 
makes sure that a firm will never produce in a joint location if there is no other location 
where it is the only producer.  
Proposition 4 also shows that the effects of informational integration carry over to the more 
general case. We obtain the following result. 
Proposition 5. Suppose assumption 2 holds. 
(i) Without intra-firm spillovers ( γ =0), there will never be an agglomeration equilibrium. 
(ii) If ∂∂M Π(M,T ) + Π(T, M)( )< 0 , an increase in informational integration (γ ) makes 
agglomeration equilibria more likely and differentiation equilibria less likely.  
(i) follows because for γ = 0  the left-hand side of (9) is Π(H,T ) + Π(T ,H ) + Π(0,0) , 
which is bounded above by F according to assumption 2. (ii) says that an increase in 
informational integration makes agglomeration more likely if rising profits in the periphery 
location where the firm produces ( Π(M ,T ) ) outweigh decreasing profits in the periphery 
location that the firm serves from the center (Π(T, M) ). 
7 Summary and Conclusions 
Using a simple framework, this paper identified a potentially important element in the 
generation of agglomerations: the existence of knowledge spillovers within multiplant 
firms. If such internal spillovers are present, (partial) agglomeration may even result when, 
without such spillovers, the forces of competition would induce firms to produce at 
different locations. 
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Using these results, it turned out that improved informational integration makes 
agglomerations more likely. This contradicts the popular perception that reductions in 
communication costs will unambiguously favor deconcentration.14 Furthermore, decreasing 
transportation costs may make agglomerations less likely, because they reduce the increase 
in local monopoly rents obtained through knowledge spillovers from the center to the 
periphery. This observation contrasts with familiar results from the economic geography 
literature. For instance, Krugman (1991) emphasizes the idea that reductions in 
transportation costs lead to agglomeration on a macroeconomic scale, because it becomes 
cheaper to serve the entire world from a central location. This is also a possibility in our 
model, but the combination of intra-firm spillovers and increasing competition for the 
periphery  introduces a countervailing effect.15 
Acknowledgements 
We are grateful to Malte Faber, Wolfgang Leininger, Andreas Polk, Uwe Wehrspohn, and 
seminar audiences in Heidelberg, Istanbul, and Dortmund for useful discussions. An editor 
and an anonymous referee provided helpful comments. 
Appendix: Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 1. Because of Bertrand competition, firms have negative net profits in 
joint locations. The only reason why they might produce there is that the combination of 
external and internal spillovers from joint locations increases profits in locations where the 
firm produces on its own. Hence, the following strategies are dominated: 
(a) producing in a joint location with the competitor, without being the only producer in 
some other location  
(b) producing in more than one joint location.16  
                                                 
14We have concentrated on spillovers that reduce marginal costs. Spillovers that reduce fixed costs will be the 
subject of future research. 
15Note that in more recent papers, Krugman and Venables (1995) and Venables (1996) also arrive at more 
ambiguous results concerning the effects of integration.  However, they use very different arguments. 
16For the second statement note that, by assumption, a firm producing in two joint locations does not obtain 
more spillovers than a firm producing in one joint location. 
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Therefore, we only need to consider the following deviations. First, for each equilibrium, 
we need to make sure that firms would not gain from closing down production in all 
locations, that is, total profits for each firm are non-negative (conditions (1) and (4)). 
Second, we need to guarantee for the differentiation equilibrium that neither firm wants to 
deviate by building an additional plant in a location where the competitor produces 
((2),(3)). Third, for the agglomeration equilibrium we must guarantee that neither firm 
gains from closing down the plant in the joint location (5). 
Proof of Proposition 3. First, recall that for T < M , agglomeration equilibria do not exist. 
Hence, for T < M  increasing T leaves the condition for agglomeration equilibria 
unaffected. From now on, suppose T>M. 
(i) A reduction in transportation costs (T) decreases Π(H, H + T ) , Π(M ,T )  and, by 
assumption 1, Π(M ,T ) − Π(H, H + T ) . Therefore, the assertion follows immediately from 
proposition 1. 
To prove the second statement, we introduce two critical values for γ  and T. T* is defined 
by Π(H, H + T*) = F ; γ * is defined by 2Π((1 −γ *)H,T*) = 3F . T* and γ * do not 
always exist. We reformulate the second statement as follows. 
(ii) Suppose that T* and γ * exist.  Moreover, assume that 
 Π((1− γ *)H,T*) ≤ 2F  (11) 
 Π((1− γ *)H) − Π(H) ≥ F . (12) 
Then agglomeration equilibria are replaced by differentiation equilibria when 
transportation costs are reduced by a suitable amount. 
To prove (ii), the following lemma will be used. 
Lemma 1. Suppose assumption 1 holds.  
(i) If T* and γ * exist, then for every γ < γ * there exists T1(γ ) ≥ T *  such that the 
differentiation equilibrium exists if and only if T ∈ T*,T1(γ )[ ]. 
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(ii) T1(γ )  is decreasing in γ . 
(iii) No differentiation equilibrium exists for γ > γ *. If T* or γ * does not exist, no 
differentiation equilibrium exists. 
Proof of lemma 1. 
(i) If T* exists, condition (1) for a differentiation equilibrium (see proposition 1) is satisfied 
for T>T*. If γ *  exists, then, for T=T*, we obtain: 
2Π(H,H + T*) − 2Π((1− γ *)H,T*) + F = 2F −3F + F = 0 . 
Hence, for T=T*, condition (3) for a differentiation equilibrium holds with equality. 
Since Π(H, H + T ) − Π((1− γ )H,T )  is decreasing in T by assumtion 1 and γ , lowering γ  
allows an increase in T without violating the equilibrium condition  
2 Π(H, H + T ) − Π((1 − γ )H,T )[ ]+ F ≥ 0   (3) 
Therefore, the differentiation equilibrium exists for T ∈ T*,T1(γ )[ ], where, for γ ≤ γ * , 
T1(γ )  is defined as the maximal T that solves (3). For T<T*, condition (1) is violated; for 
T > T1(γ ) , the construction of T1(γ )  and assumption 1imply that (3) does not hold . 
(ii) This follows immediately from assumption 1 and the fact that condition (3) is easier to 
satisfy for lower values of γ . 
(iii) This follows from the fact that (1) is violated if T* does not exists, and that (3b) is 
violated if γ > γ *, or if γ * does not exist. 
We now return to the proof of part (ii) of proposition 3. We show that for suitable values of 
γ  both agglomeration and differentiation equilibria exist, depending on the level of T. (12) 
implies that there exists a T 0  such that Π((1− γ *)H,T ) − Π(H, H + T ) ≥ F  for all T> T 0 . 
Since Π((1− γ *)H,T*) ≤ 2F  by (11), but Π(H, H + T*) = F , we must have T 0 > T * . 
Since Π(H, H + T ) ≥ F  for T ≥ T * ,Π((1− γ *)H,T ) − Π(H, H + T ) ≥ F  implies 
Π((1− γ *)H,T ) ≥ 2F  for all T> T 0 . Hence, for T>T 0  and γ  = γ *  an agglomeration 
equilibrium exists. Therefore, there exists a range of values for γ  such that differentiation 
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equilibria and agglomeration equilibria exist, depending on the level of T. Because higher 
transportation costs favor agglomeration equilibria, (ii) follows. 
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